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WHAT'S YOURS IS OURS? GAMETE DONATION IN THE
MARITAL CONTEXT: WHY COURTS AND LEGISLATURES
SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH AN INDIVIDUAL'S
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In August 2012, a woman from Surrey, England, ignited a
worldwide debate when she wrote to the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority demanding that sperm donation requirements
include consent of the donor's spouse. 1 Arguing that her husband's
sperm should be treated as a joint "marital asset," the woman quoted
her marital vow: "All that I am is yours."2 The woman admitted that
she was appalled when she learned that her husband had donated his
sperm without her consent. 3 She feared that her husband's sperm
"may already have been used to father children who in 18 years' time
may come knocking on [their] door, disrupting family life and
unsettling [their] own children. "4
In 2005, an English law was enacted that gave all children born
through sperm donation the right to trace their biological father when
they reach adulthood, solidifying this woman's concerns. 5 Although
United States courts have not yet made a similar ruling, 6 the practice
of open gamete donation 7 and the availability of registries allowing
children born through gamete donation to contact donors and halfsiblings make donor-child contact more likely than ever before. 8
Because of this, courts and legislatures should consider the rights of
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

Tamara Cohen, Wife Whose Husband Became Secret Sperm Donor Calls for Change
in the Law to Require Partners' Consent, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 26, 2012 6:34AM),
http://www.Dai1yMail.co.uk/news/article-2193780/.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Jennifer A. Baines, Note, Gamete Donors and Mistaken Identities: The
Importance of Genetic Awareness and Proposals Favoring Donor Identity Disclosure
for Children Born from Gamete Donations in the United States, 45 FAM. CT. REv.
116, 121 (2007).
Id.
"Donor gametes" are donated egg and sperm cells that are used to create embryos,
allowing parents to give birth to children through assisted reproduction. Id. at 117.
Jean Benward et al., Maximizing Autonomy and the Changing View
of
Donor
Conception: The Creation of a National Donor Registry, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 225, 227-28 (2009).
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the donor spouse and the effect that a child born outside of the
marriage through gamete donation may have on existing family life
when a married person donates gametes. 9
This Comment explores the potential advantages and disadvantages
of United States courts and legislatures requiring spousal consent
before gametes are donated. 1° First, this Comment describes how
public policy views marriage as a partnership and favors sharing
between spouses. 11 Second, this Comment looks at the procedures,
guidelines, and regulations of gamete donation to determine the
industry's possible effect on marital life. 12 Third, this Comment
considers the arguments for and against requiring spousal consent
prior to gamete donation. 13 Finally, this Comment suggests that
courts and legislatures honor the fundamental right to privacy by not
requiring spousal consent before gametes are donated, based on the
"slippery slope" that spousal consent may cause by inhibiting other
personal decisions and the negative impact that spousal consent
would have on the gamete donation industry. 14
II.

PUBLIC POLICY VIEWS MARRIAGE AS A PARTNERSHIP

The right to marry is a fundamental Constitutional right 15 that has
historically been characterized by the "three goods" of procreation,
fidelity, and life-long commitment. 16 The Supreme Court has
described marriage as:
[A] coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. 17
Marriage is not "a union of economically separate individuals, with
each acquiring property for themselves, and not for the marital

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id. at 238-39.
See infra Parts V-VI.
See infra Part II.
See i'!fra Part III-IV.
See i'!fra Parts V-VI.
See i'lfra Part VII.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12 (1967).
Lynn D. Wardle, What is Marriage?, 6 WHITIIER J.
(2006).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965).

CHILD

& FAM. Aovoc. 53, 79
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unit." 18 Rather, marriage has become viewed as a "shared enterprise,
a joint undertaking, that in many ways is akin to a partnership." 19 It
is expected that within this partnership, spouses will share resources,
responsibilities, and risks, which in turn will encourage commitment,
This
gender equality, and joint childcare responsibilities. 20
partnership ideal creates a public policy notion of promoting sharing
behavior between married spouses. 21
It is important to note that "sharing principles do function in a large
majority of marriages and . . . the generally applicable law should
further and protect the majority expectations of sharing. Most
spouses expect to pool resources, to share property and to benefit
from each other's eamings."22 Although the partnership principle is
primarily used to determine the division of assets at the dissolution of
a marriage/ 3 it is equally important for courts and legislatures to
determine whether public policy also encourages spouses to share the
decision of deciding whether to donate gametes, and furthermore,
whether spousal consent should be required when doing so.
III. THE HISTORY OF GAMETE DONATION

A.

Donation Procedures

Approximately 40,000 children are born in the United States each
year with the use of donated sperm and eggs. 24 Sperm donation has
been available since 1945, while egg donation was first successfully
used for conception in 1984.25 These practices, as well as all other

18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.
25.

Laura W. Morgan & EdwardS. Snyder, When Title Matters: Transmutation and the
Joint Title Gift Presumption, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 335, 336 (2003).
Ellen J. Beardsley, The Revised UPC Elective Share: Missing Essential Partnership
Principles, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 225, 229 (1998) (quoting Med. Bus. Assocs.,
Inc. v. Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d 890, 894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)).
Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Public/Private Distinction, 36
HARV. C. R-C.L. L. REv. 79, 103 (2001).
Sally Burnett Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable
Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REv. 195, 199 (1987).
Kathy T. Graham, The Uniform Marital Property Act: A Solution for Common Law
Property Systems?, 48 S.D. L. REv. 455, 461 (2003).
Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth
Distribution at Divorce: In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 141,
148 (2004).
Julie L. Sauer, Competing Interests and Gamete Donation: The Case for Anonymity,
39 SETON HALL L. REV. 919, 924-25 (2009).
!d. at 925, 928.
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artificial reproductive technologies, rapidly gained popularity after
the birth ofthe first "test-tube baby," Louise Brown in 1978. 26
The donation process for a male is very different than for a
female. 27 When a male chooses to donate sperm, he must first
provide a detailed medical history and a semen sample that undergoes
various testing and screening procedures to ensure that his semen
meets the sperm bank's standards. 28 Once it is determined that his
semen has a high sperm count and is free of any inheritable or
infectious diseases, he may contract to donate. 29 The donor typically
agrees to produce samples one to two times per week for a year, 30 and
is compensated $100 to $350 per vial. 31
However, when a woman donates her eggs, she must complete a
medical process far more extensive than sperm donation. 32 After
finishing medical history questionnaires, medical screening, and
psychological screening to determine that she meets the donation
bank's requirements, the woman begins taking medicine that stops
the normal functioning of her ovaries. 33 She then completes hormone
injections over the next four weeks to stimulate the ovaries to create
more eggs than usual. 34 After blood tests and ultrasounds show that
the donor is responding positively to the injected hormones, the eggs
are harvested and surgically removed from the woman through
transvaginal ovarian aspiration. 35
The entire process takes
approximately six weeks and the woman is paid between $5,000 and
$8,000 for the cycle. 36
26.

27.
28.

29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for Non-Anonymous Gamete
Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 6-7 (2008). Louise Brown was the first child
conceived through in vitro fertilization with the use of her father's sperm and
mother's egg. Marsha Garrison, The Technological Family: What's New and What's
Not, 33 FAM. L.Q. 691, 692 (1999).
See Mary Kate Kearney, Identifying Sperm and Egg Donors: Opening Pandora's Box,
13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 215,224-26 (2011).
!d. at 225. Typical standards include screening for communicable diseases and
providing a semen sample that is frozen and then thawed to determine its semen
parameters. !d.; Mary Patricia Byrn & Rebecca Ireland, Anonymously Provided
Sperm and the Constitution, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. I, 1 (20 12).
Bym & Ireland, supra note 28, at 1.

Anetta Pietrzak, The Price of Sperm: An Economic Analysis of the Current
Regulations Surrounding the Gamete Donation Industry, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 121,
130 (2012).
Kearney, supra note 27, at 225.

!d.
See Sauer, supra note 24, at 926.
!d.
!d. at 926-27.
!d.
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The Gamete Donation Industry

While the donation procedures and pay between sperm and egg
donors vary, the general application process and regulations of the
gamete banks are similar. 37 Overall, the donation industry prides
itself on being very selective when choosing donors, 38 and bases its
practices on factors including "cultural value, price, supply, and
demand." 39 Sperm and egg banks "must 'recruit "sellable" donors
who provide "high quality" gametes to recipients who "shop"
different . . . banks. "'40 Typically, donors must be in their early
twenties to mid-thirties, well educated, and in good health. 41 In order
to meet customer demand, gamete banks allow donee-parents to
"pick and choose" gametes by viewing donor profiles to find which
donor best meets their list of qualifications. 42 Donor profiles at a
minimum include "detailed, non-identifying information about the
potential donor's characteristics and medical history." 43 To keep up
with market competition, many gamete banks have begun to include
more identifying information, such as "audio interviews, childhood
pictures, adult pictures, silhouettes, and staff impressions of the
donor."44

37.
38.
39.
40.

41.

42.
43.
44.

See id. at 926-29.
Bym & Ireland, supra note 28, at 1.
Pietrzak, supra note 30, at 129-30.
/d. at 130 (quoting Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender Egg Agencies,
Sperm Banks, and the Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. Soc. REv. 319,
325 (2007)).
See Sauer, supra note 24, at 926; see also Kearney, supra note 27, at 225; Pietrzak,
supra note 30, at 131; Becoming a
Donor,
THE
WORLD
EGG
BANK,
http://www.theworldeggbank.com/donors-qualifications.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2013) (including requirements that egg donors be between 18-30 years old and in
good mental and physical health); Become a Sperm Donor, CAL. CRYOBANK,
http://www.cryobank.com/Services/Become-a-Sperm-Donor/ (last visited Nov. 21,
2013) (including requirements that the sperm donor be between the ages of 19-38, in
good health, and attending a university or holding some advanced degree); Egg Donor
Information: Requirements for Donor, EGG DONATION CTR. OF DALLAS, INC.,
http://www.eggdonorcenter.com/dnreq.html (last visited Nov. 21, 20 13) (including
requirements that the egg donor be between the ages of 18-29, be in good health, and
have an SAT score of at least 1100 and a G.P.A. of at least 3.0).
Pietrzak, supra note 30, at 131.
Dennison, supra note 26, at 11-12.
Andrea Mechanick Braverman, How the Internet is Reshaping Assisted Reproduction:
From Donor Offspring Registries to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, II MINN. J.
L. SCI. & TECH. 477, 485 (2010).
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Sperm and egg banks also allow the donor to choose between
closed and open donation. 45 When a donor chooses to remain
anonymous, he or she contracts to giving the client only nonidentifying information, and relinquishes all control of the donated
sample. 46 He or she will never know whether the sample was used to
conceive a child. 47 However, if a donor chooses an open donation, he
or she allows the gamete bank to give identifying information to
children born from the sample if requested. 48
Although most donors choose to remain anonymous, 49 there has
been a recent movement towards open donation. 50 Other countries
have banned the use of anonymous gamete donors, including
Sweden, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, New Zealand, the
Australian states of Victoria and Western Australia, the Netherlands,
Norway, and the United Kingdom. 51 These countries relied on a
child's right to know his or her biological parentage, the best interests
of the child, and the importance of knowing one's medical history to
support these laws. 52 Although these laws have resulted in a smaller
supply of available gametes after implementation, it has been argued
that the resulting donor profile is more favorable. 53
While
anonymous donors "were predominantly students donating for
financial gain ... [,] post-legislation donors are older men in their
late 30s or 40s, married with children, motivated by a desire to help
infertile couples."54 Sperm banks in the United States also offer
higher pay to donors who choose open donation, further enticing
donors to choose open donation over closed donation. 55
See Bym & Ireland, supra note 28, at 1-2.
See id. at 2; see also Sauer, supra note 24, at 929.
Sauer, supra note 24, at 929.
Dennison, supra note 26, at 12.
Sauer, supra note 24, at 929.
See Braverman, supra note 44, at 485; Dennison, supra note 26, at 11.
like Turkmendag et a!., The Removal ofDonor Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of
Claims by Would-Be Parents, 22 INT'LJ. L. PoL'Y & FAM. 283,284 (2008).
52.
Id. at 284, 289, 291.
53.
I d. at 288.
54.
Id.
55.
See Donor Semen, CAL. CYROBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/Services!Pricing (last
visited Nov. 21, 2013)(stating that the price per vial of semen donated by an open donor
costs $100 more than a vial of semen donated by an anonymous donor); Fees, FAIRFAX
CRYOBANK, http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/Fees2013.shtml(last visited Nov. 21, 2013)
(including prices for additional services to prospective donees, including costs for personal
profiles, audio interviews, and childhood photographs of open donors).
Egg donation
websites typically do not state whether there is a greater cost for the use of an open
donor's eggs or to view identifying information.
See Fees, THE WORLD EGG
BANK,http://theworldeggbank.com/fees.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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IV. THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF GAMETE
DONATION.
Today, regulation of the gamete industry in the United States is
fairly undeveloped, especially in comparison to other countries, and
is considered governed by laissez-faire economics. 56 There is no state
or federal law that enforces or prohibits anonymous or open gamete
donation. 57
The Food and Drug Administration (F.D.A.) requires gamete banks
to register with the F.D.A. and to list their address, functions, and the
type of tissues handled. 58 Its Donor Eligibility Rule requires gamete
donors to complete a physical examination, a medical history
interview, and to be free of any infectious diseases. 59 If a donor is
found to have a risk factor or evidence of an infectious disease, he or
she is ineligible to donate. 60 However, the F.D.A. does not concern
itself with any genetic abnormalities. 61 Its Good Tissue Practice rule
calls for periodic inspections of gamete banks to ensure compliance
with these rules. 62 The Center for Disease Control publishes an
annual report solely on the success rates of fertility clinics. 63 No
federal law exists concerning how many times a person can donate
gametes, how many children can be conceived through the use of one
donor, payment, or whether spousal consent is required for a married
donor. 64
Most state laws enacted regarding gamete donation discuss
paternity issues and are based on the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). 65
Some states have adopted the 1973 version of the UPA, which states
that when a married woman is inseminated with donor sperm and

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See Dennison, supra note 26, at 8-10; Pietrzak, supra note 30, at 122.
Sauer, supra note 24, at 931.
Pietrzak, supra note 30, at 124.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor Gamete
Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CAREL. 203,206-07 (2009).
64. Id. at 207.
65.
Pieterzak, supra note 30, at 125. The Uniform Parentage Act was created by the
National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973. This Act fostered
the use of donated gametes, stating that when a wife is artificially inseminated by a physician
with donor sperm and her husband consents, the husband shall be treated as the natural father
of the resulting child. See Dennison, supra note 26, at 6.
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conceives a child, her husband is considered the natural father. 66
Some have adopted the 2002 version of the UP A, which states that a
donor is not a parent of a child conceived through assisted
reproduction, and cannot sue or be sued regarding parental rights and
obligations. 67 Others do not have any statute to protect donors from
incurring the rights and responsibilities of a legal parent, and
common law applies. 68 Only two states, Ohio and New York, have
gone beyond the F.D.A's Donor Eligibility Rule to require more
extensive screening of gamete donors for genetic risk factors. 69
Although the American Society for Reproductive Medicine and the
American Association of Tissue Banks offer guidance on some of
these issues for donors and gamete banks, their recommendations are
merely persuasive. 70 Therefore, the gamete industry is usually left to
decide what is best for its practice, and will often allow the parent's
private choice to conceive a child to develop the market at will. 71
V. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF REQUIRING SPOUSAL
CONSENT BEFORE GAMETES ARE DONATED
There are many arguments that favor requiring spousal consent for
gamete donation. 72 Not only does public policy favor spousal consent

66.

67.

68.

69.
70.
71.
72.

See Pieterzak, supra note 30, at 125. These states include Minnesota,
Missouri,
Montana, and Nevada. See id. at 126. The states of California, Illinois, New Jersey,
and Wisconsin have relied on the 1973 UP A but have removed the word "married" or
made similar changes to grant more rights to unmarried women and sperm donors. /d.
New Hampshire, Ohio, and Oregon have statutes regarding gamete donation that are
essentially the same as the 1973 UPA. /d.
/d.
These states include Colorado, Delaware, North Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming. /d. The states of Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho,
New Mexico, and Virginia have statutes that have the same effect as the 2002 UPA.
/d. at 126-27.
/d. at 127. These states include Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. /d. Alaska, Arizona, New
York, North Carolina, and Tennessee have not adopted a version of the UPA, but their
state statutes include gamete donation regulations by stating that "a child conceived
through artificial insemination and born to a married couple is the natural and
legitimate child of both parents." !d. It is important to note, however, that if the
woman using artificial insemination is not married, the gamete donor may face future
liability for parental responsibility. /d.
/d. at 127-28.
See Cahn, supra note 63, at 207.
See Pietrzak, supra note 30, at 131.
See Guido Pennings, Partner Consent for Sperm Donation, 11 HUM. REPROD. 1132,
1132-33 (1996) (indicating sexual exclusivity and adultery, family composition, and
procreational exclusivity as reasons for spousal consent for gamete donation).
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based on the strong views regarding marriage as a partnership, but it
is also much easier today to find donors, open or anonymous, than in
the past. 73 These conceived children may enter into donors' lives
unannounced, affecting their marriage and family lives. 74 The gamete
donation industry is not well-equipped with thorough regulations to
handle these issues. 75
A. Public Policy Favors Marriage Mentality ofSharing

There is currently a movement encouraging courts to change their
perceptions on the legal status of gametes. 76 In Davis v. Davis, a
divorcing couple sought to determine the property rights of frozen
pre-embryos that were created during their marriage. 77 The court
determined that pre-embryos are not persons or property, but occupy
an "interim" category that entitles them to "special respect," due to
their potential for human life. 78 Because of this, disputes should be
resolved by looking to the preferences of the parents, and then to any
prior agreement. 79 Finally, the relative interests should be weighed,
and the party seeking to avoid parenthood should prevail if the other
party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by other
means. 80
The principles established in this case led the court in Hecht v.
Superior Court to determine that the sperm cell is also an "interim
73.

74.

75.

76.
77.
78.
79.

80.

See id. at 1134; see also About Xytex, XYTEX CRYO INT'L SPERM BANK
http://www.xytex.com/sperm-bank:-get-started/ (last visited
Sept.
21,
2013)
(illustrating how a simple internet search will allow you to search sperm donors by
race, height, and eye color, and access thousands of sperm donors).
See Robin Romm, All His Children: A Sperm Donor Discovers his Rich, Unsettling
Legacy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 20 II, 3:59
PM),
http://www .theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/20 II /12/all-his-children/308714/
(detailing how the mother of a child conceived with donor sperm created a public blog
praising the quality of the donor's sperm and included the donor's baby pictures in the
post).
DNA testing is making donors easier to trace, and sperm donor websites have varying
levels of preparedness to deal with this reality. See Rachel Lehmann-Haupt, Are
Sperm Donors Really Anonymous Anymore? DNA Testing Makes Them
Easy
to
SLATE
MAGAZINE
(Mar.
1,
2010,
9:36
AM),
Trace,
http://www .slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/20 l 0/02/are_sperm_donors_really_a
nonymous_anymore.single.html.
See Ernest Waintraub, Are Sperm Cells a Form of Property? A Biological Inquiry into
the Legal Status of the Sperm Cell, II QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. I, 1 (2007).
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
Id. at 597.
/d. at 604.
/d.
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category" between persons and property, and deserving of "special
respect. " 81
However, the scientific research used to support the court's
decision in Hecht may not be persuasive. Sperm cells are living
entities, but cannot create the potential for life on their own. 82 Sperm
"do not produce proteins that aid in its protection and further
development. Sperm only produce materials that are specific to
fertilization." 83 Therefore, a sperm's value "is not inherent because it
is not, and cannot develop into, a person .... [It] arises from its
potential to create a person after fertilization, growth, and birth. "84
Because of this, many scholars have argued that sperm should instead
be recognized as property. 85
If the legal status of sperm were changed from an interim category
deserving of "special respect" to property, today's public policy
could favor the requirement of spousal consent for gamete donation.
Public policy encourages the philosophy that marriage is a joint
partnership. 86 It is expected that partners share their property with
one another, and that each party is acting in a way that benefits the
marriage. 87
Therefore, when a married person is a gamete donor, it could be
argued that when he or she donates sperm or eggs, although the
property is only coming from one party, the implications of this
decision affect both partners to the marriage. 88 This decision will
affect the financial situation of the parties, the amount of time they
can spend together, their sex lives, and possibly their family if a
conceived child is able to make meaningful contact with the donor.
The property can thus be presumed as being created for the benefit of
the marriage, and as a joint venture in which both parties have an
interest. Not only does spousal consent comply with public policy,
but it also ensures that the parties make a meaningful decision
together as to what is best for their marriage.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Cal.
Waintraub, supra note 76, at 5.
See Waintraub, supra note 76, at 10.
!d.
/d. at II.
/d. at 12.
See supra text accompanying note 19.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
See infra text accompanying notes lll-14.

Ct.

App.

1993);
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It is Easier to Find Donors Today Than in the Past

It is easier to find a gamete donor today than ever before, 89 as there
has been a growing trend towards open donation. 90 With this, fertility
clinic clients are receiving more identifying information about the
donor, including his or her name, personal history, photographs, and
medical background. 91 Many parents are now choosing to disclose to
their children that they were conceived with donated sperm or eggs. 92
Some open donations even allow for continuous contact with the
family after the conception of the child. 93 If a parent chooses to give
this information to his or her child, it would be relatively easy for the
child to locate the donor and make contact. 94
Although most gamete donations today are closed donations, 95 it is
foreseeable that federal or state law could change to ban closed
adoptions. 96 In 1989, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child deemed the right to know one's parent as a "fundamentally
important human right." 97 Many other countries have relied on the
best interests of the child, the need for medical history, and a child's
right to know of his or her biological parent, plus the overwhelming
need for greater regulation in the gamete donation industry, to justify
outlawing closed donation. 98 These arguments may be strong enough
to impose laws favoring open donation in the United States as well. 99
If children were to receive more identifying information about their
biological parents, it would be easier to track the parent down. 100
Even if the United States did not change its gamete donation
policy, it is still possible to fmd a closed donor with the nonSee Braverman, supra note 44, at 486-87.
See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
Braverman, supra note 44, at 485.
!d.
See Linda Villarosa, Once-Invisible Sperm Donors Get to Meet the Family, N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/21/health/once-invisiblesperm-donors-get-to-meet-the-family .htrnl.
94. Braverman, supra note 44, at 486-87.
95. Elizabeth Siberry Chestney, The Right to Know One's Genetic Origin: Can, Should,
or Must a State that Extends this Right to Adoptees Extend an Analogous Right to
Children Conceived with Donor Gametes?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 365,366 (2001).
96. Many scholars have written articles urging the federal legislature to ban closed gamete
donation. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 63, at 205; Chestney, supra note 95, at 368;
Dennison, supra note 26, at 3.
97. Dennison, supra note 26, at 8.
98.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
99.
100. See Braverman, supra note 44, at 486-87.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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identifying information that is given to parents by the fertility
clinic. 101 In 2005, a donor-conceived teenager infamously discovered
his biological father with the use of his date and place of birth,
Internet search engines, and a mail order DNA kit. 102 Once he found
out the donor's name, the teen was able to make contact with his
father within ten days' time. 103
The advent of donor registry sites also allows donors and donorconceived children who are willing to communicate to provide
identifying information in hopes of contacting others who are
biologically related to them. 104 One of the most popular sites, Donor
Sibling Registry, has connected more than 9,747 half-siblings and
donors with one another, and has enlisted 38,218 members as of
January 2013. 105
Furthermore, at least eighteen states have enacted laws that allow
donor-conceived children to receive identifying information about
their biological parents via court order if they are able to show "good
cause." 106 Courts must weigh the interests of the child in accessing
the donor's identifying information with the donor's interest in
privacy. 107 While a mere curiosity to know one's genetic origins is
not sufficient to meet the "good cause" standard, courts will generally
permit the court order if there is a compelling medical reason. 108 One
court has even gone so far as to hold that a donor's "reasonable
expectation of privacy in his identity was substantially diminished by
his own conduct" of frequent donations to the clinic which amounted
to "a substantial commercial transaction likely to affect the lives of
many people." 109 Because of this, "it would be unreasonable for ...
[the donor] to expect that his genetic and medical history, and
possibly even his identity, would never be disclosed." 110
Based on recent donation trends, emerging state law, and the
availability of donor registry websites, it is apparent that now, more
101.
102.
103.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See Dennison, supra note 26, at 1-2.
/d.
/d. What happened after contact was made between the donor and child was not made
public. /d. This story highlights many of the concerns regarding anonymity, or lack
thereof, in the gamete industry today. /d.
!d. at 12.
!d.; THE DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com (last visited
Nov. 21, 2013).
Dennison, supra note 26, at 11. These states include Alabama, California, Colorado,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico. !d. at 11 n.80.
/d. at 11.
See Sauer, supra note 24, at 939-42.
Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
/d.
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than ever before, donor-conceived children have a stronger
possibility of finding their biological parent. 111 It can be inferred that
if a child fmds his or her biological parent, he or she will also want to
make contact. 112 This contact will not only affect the donor and
donor-conceived child, but will also implicate the donor's family life
with the addition of a new "child" to the family. 113 While this
interaction could be positive, negative, or neutral on existing family
life, public policy favoring the shared responsibilities of marital life
suggests that a donor's spouse should be aware of this possibility. 114
To ensure that the married couple has made a careful, deliberate
decision regarding the donation process and the possibility of later
contact with the donor-conceived child, the spouse should also be
required to consent to the use of the donated sperm or eggs.
C.

Gamete Industry Policies and the Law Today

It is apparent that the gamete donation industry prefers to take a
laissez-faire approach when regulating its procedures. 115
The
industry typically does not implement a guideline until it determines
such a guideline has been requested based on market demand. 116 The
industry has taken no steps to further protect its clients other than
what has been mandated by the FDA, which has proven to be of very
little guidance. 117 What the industry has not yet realized, however, is
that by requiring the spousal consent of gamete donors, it could
actually better meet the needs of people involved in the donation
process: the donor, the client, and the resulting child.
Gamete donors are mostly young and motivated by fmancial
compensation, instead of altruism. 118 Because of this, it likely that a
donor is not thinking about the possible repercussions of his or her
decision, and how the decision may affect their family life over a
decade or two later. The present trend towards open donation in the
gamete donation industry could lead to new policies that retroactively

See Braverman, supra note 44, at 486--87.
See, e.g., Dennison, supra note 26, at 1-2 (describing one person's efforts to find his
birth parents).
113. See, e.g., Turkmendag et al., supra note 51, at 291 (discussing the social implications
of discovering an unknown family or offspring).
114. See supra Part II.
115. See supra Part IV.
116. See supra Part IV.
117. See supra Part IV.
118. See Kearney, supra note 27, at 224, 226.
Ill.
112.
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allow recipients to learn identifying information about a closed
donor, which the donor believed would remain anonymous. 119
By requiring spousal consent, the industry will ensure that a gamete
donor has given more thought to the process than if the donation had
been completed without the acknowledgement of the spouse. It will
do more to prepare the donor and his or her family for any future
regulation that the industry deems fit based on the market supply and
demand. Further, it may lead to older men and women donating with
the desire to help families, instead of for financial compensation. 120
This evolution towards a new, more altruistic donor profile may be
preferable to the standard donor today. 121
A well-informed, prepared donor is more marketable to a
prospective client than an uneducated, uninformed donor. Parents
using donated gametes have begun to shift towards disclosing to their
children their genetic origins. 122 This has led to clients requesting
more information on the donors, which the clinics have willingly
provided. 123 Some clients have even gone so far as to seek open
arrangements. 124 With these specific demands, it would likely make
clients feel more comfortable with their decision if they were not
only sure that the donor was agreeing to future contact, but also his or
her family was willing to allow further communication. Spousal
consent would allow fertility clinic clients to have greater confidence
in what they have contracted for with donors.
Most children born from donated gametes have expressed
frustration about the lack of information they have about their
biological parent. 125 The most common reasons for wanting to know

119. Other countries have not permitted their open donation laws to apply retroactively.
See, e.g., Turkmendag eta!., supra note 51, at 286 (explaining that after April1, 2005,
donors of sperm, eggs, or embryos in the United Kingdom would be unable to
preserve their anonymity, as those born after April 1, 2005 from donated sperm, eggs,
or embryos may obtain donor identifying information at age eighteen). However, at
least one United States court has held that a donor has a substantially diminished
expectation of privacy based on the fact that fertility clinics tell donors that nonidentifYing medical history and information is disclosed to the client, and that frequent
donations are a "substantial commercial transaction likely to affect the lives of many
people." Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
Therefore, it would not be unreasonable for the gamete donation industry to
retroactively disclose donor information to its clients if it were the market demand.
120. Turkmendag et a!., supra note 51, at 288.
121. !d.
122. Braverman, supra note 44, at 485.
123. !d.
124. !d.
125. Dennison, supra note 26, at 13.
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more information about the biological parent include the desire to
know family health history, concerns regarding possible incest
between donor siblings, and the psychological need to know one's
biological origins. 126 It is apparent that children have a desire to
reach out to their biological parents, and with the advent of home
DNA kits and donor-sibling registry sites, connections are being
made now more than ever before. 127
As previously stated, requiring spousal consent allows the donor to
make the donation decision in a family setting, hopefully causing him
or her to consider the very real possibility of a donor-child finding the
family at some point in time. 128 This conversation would better
prepare the donor for any future child-initiated contact, which would
be in the best interests of the child. 129
VI. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REQUIRING SPOUSAL
CONSENT BEFORE GAMETES ARE DONATED
While there are strong arguments in favor of requiring spousal
consent before gametes are donated, there are just as many important,
and more compelling, reasons why donors should not need their
spouses' consent. Not only may laws requiring spousal consent
impose constitutional concerns, but it could also lead to a dangerous
pattern of extending this consent to other personal decisions. Further,
it may cause many negative implications in the gamete donation
industry.

A.

The Fundamental Right to Autonomy

Privacy is recognized as a fundamental constitutional right under
the Due Process Clause. 130 This right can be diminished by a
person's actions, 131 making it plausible that a gamete donor may not

!d. at 14-17.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.B.
One child born with the assistance of an anonymous sperm donor has stated that he
"didn't ask to be born into this situation, with its limitations and confusion. It's
hypocritical of parents and medical professionals to assume that biological roots
won't matter to the 'products' of the cryobanks' service, when the longing for a
biological relationship is what brings customers to the bank in the first place."
Dennison, supra note 26, at 17.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV§ I; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
131. See Dennison, supra note 26, at 21 (citing Hill v. Nat') Collegiate Athl. Ass'n, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 834, 856-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("The extent of a privacy interest is not

126.
127.
128.
129.
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have a reasonable expectation of privacy against a resulting child if
courts or legislatures were to require open donations and ban closed
donations. 132 However, even though public policy views marriage as
a partnership, 133 it may be unreasonable to assume that this marital
commitment would lead to a diminished expectation of privacy and
require a donor to inform his or her spouse. 134
There is no existing case law that discusses requiring spousal
consent when donating gametes. However, there has been one case
from the Supreme Court of Washington regarding a frozen preembryo dispute between a divorcing couple that may offer some
guidance. 135 In Litowitz v. Litowitz, a couple contracted with a
fertility clinic to create and store pre-embryos with the use of the
male spouse's sperm and a donated egg. 136 The court stated in dicta
that because the wife was not biologically related to the pre-embryos,
the sole reason she had a right to access the pre-embryos was because
she had signed a contract with her husband and the fertility clinic in
regard to their disposition. 137 Therefore, the court implied that if
there had not been a contractual right to the pre-embryos, the
husband's right to privacy would have controlled the outcome of the
dispute. 138 His right to procreate would have trumped his wife's
interest solely because he had a biological connection to the preembryos, and she did not. 139
Even if the Litowitz court incorrectly stated that the right to privacy
requires a biological connection to protect one's constitutional
interest to pre-embryos, and rather intent should be the determining
factor, as suggested by other cases, 140 there is a still a strong argument
that requiring spousal consent for gamete donation would be

132.
133.
134.

independent of the circumstances. Even when a legally cognizable privacy interest is
present, other factors may affect a person's reasonable expectation of privacy . . .
customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities may create
or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy.")).
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part II.
See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
70-71
(1976)
(finding that a husband does not have the unilateral authority to prevent his wife from
procuring an abortion if she chooses to do so).
See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 262-63 (Wash. 2002).
/d. at 267-68.
!d.
/d. at 267.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139. /d.
140. Lainie M. C. Dillon, Conundrums with Penumbras: The Right to
Encompasses Non-Gamete Providers who Create Preembryos with
Become Parents, 78 WASH. L. REv. 625, 642-45 (2003).

Privacy
the Intent to
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unconstitutional because the other spouse is not part of the donation
process. 141
If "the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free .from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 142 In
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Supreme
Court held that it was unconstitutional to require spousal consent for
a woman to receive an abortion. 143 The Court recognized that a
husband has a strong interest in a married couple's pregnancy and the
decision to get an abortion should ideally be made by both the
husband and wife. 144 The effects of an abortion could be "profound,"
both physically and mentally, and "possibly deleterious" to the
marriage. 145
However, because the woman physically bears the child and is
more "directly and immediately" affected by the pregnancy, the
Court stated that the balance must be in the wife's favor to not
require consent. 146 The Court further reasoned that it would be
difficult for "the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage,
and of strengthening the marital relationship and the marriage
institution, ... [to] be achieved by giving the husband a veto power
exercisable for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all." 147
In Danforth, the Supreme Court stated spousal consent for an
abortion was unconstitutional even though the male spouse's
biological material and intent were also involved. 148 Therefore, it is
likely that the Supreme Court would extend this same reasoning to a
gamete donor, whose spouse's biological material and intent is not
concerned, and would find it unconstitutional to require spousal
consent for gamete donation.
B.

The Slippery Slope

One major implication of courts categorizing gamete donation as
requiring spousal consent is that it may lead to the regulation of other
personal decisions. The fertility industry views a parent's ability to
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added).
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
!d. at 71.
!d. at 70.
!d. at 71.
!d.
See id. at 69.
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conceive as a private choice, free from government intrusion, which
allows the market to develop based on price, supply, and demand. 149
Therefore,
the only basis for a successful defence [sic] of gametedonation is the outright denial that the donor is in any way
personally present through his genetic contribution. We
must regard the sperm and ovum rather in the same light as
we would regard a donated kidney, as human material but
Bodily spare parts are
not as personally human.
exchangeable because, although they belonged to someone
in particular, and grew at the behest of his genetic
constitution, they do not convey his genetic individuality. 150
By viewing gametes in this context, comparable to any other body
part, who is to say that requiring spousal consent would not then
reasonably extend to a kidney donation, enlisting as an organ donor
on a driver's license, or to cosmetic surgery? Due to a person's
fundamental right to privacy, such requirements would be taking
spousal consent too far. Courts should fear this very real possibility
of a "slippery slope," where spousal consent would be required for
any decision regarding a married person's body. Not only could this
lead to a decline in gamete donations, 151 but also a decline in
marriage as well. 152
C.

Implications in the Gamete Donation Industry

One concern with requiring spousal consent is that it may decrease
the availability and quality of donated gametes. 153 A donor may
decide that gametes are not worth donating if he or she has to tell a
spouse, or the couple may decide together that it is not best for their
family. After the United Kingdom and the Australian states of
Victoria and Western Australia created laws that required open
gamete donations, there was an initial donor shortage. 154 This led to
fertility clinics accepting less than ideal donors, long waiting lists,
and the beginnings of a semen market on the Internet, which posed
149. Pietrzak, supra note 30, at 131.
150. Turkmendag et al., supra note 51, at 291.
151. There are many problems that would arise as a result of decreased gamete donations.
See supra Part V.B.
152. Marriage has historically been viewed by United States courts as an important,
"sacred" relationship. See supra Part II.
153. See Turkmendag et al., supra note 51, at 284.
154. !d. at 284, 288.
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safety concems. 155 The shortage also made it less likely for clients to
find a donor with characteristics similar to themselves. 156
While this did lead to an older, "more ethical" donor profile in
these countries, semen volume and motility decrease with age,
making the sperm less likely to fertilize an egg. 157 By the time a
woman is thirty, only ten percent of the eggs she was born with are
left in her body. 158 The quality of the eggs has also deteriorated,
increasing the likelihood of chromosome dysfunction and
mutations. 159 The covering around the eggs also becomes thicker and
blocks sperm, decreasing the chance of fertilization. 160 Therefore,
aged donors are less desirable for both the gamete industry and its
clients. 161
By adding even more regulations to an already difficult application
process and donation procedure, 162 it is likely that there would be a
decrease in donors similar to the United Kingdom and Australia, and
the same resulting problems would arise in the United States. It
could then be argued that requiring consent is unconstitutional
because it imposes a burden on parental reproductive choice. 163
There would be no value of a "child who is never conceived because
of the reluctance of gamete donors to take on a long-term
commitment from which they may reasonably only expect to derive
emotional costs rather than benefits." 164

!d. at 284.
!d. at 295.
!d. at 288.
Roger Fortuna & Suzan Clarke, For Women Who Want Kids, 'the Sooner the Better':
90 Percent ofEggs Gone by Age 30, ABC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2010), http://abcnews.go.
corn/GMA/OnCalVwomen-fertility-falls-lose-90-percent-eggs-30/story?id=96930 15.
159. Eggs, Fertility, and Age: How it Works, PARENTING, http://www.parenting.
com/article/eggs-fertility-and-age-how-it-works (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
160. /d.
161. See Turkrnendag eta!., supra note 51, at 288.
162. See supra Part III-IV.
163. See Dennison, supra note 26, at 19. In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court held that "[i]f
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of an individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
164. See Turkrnendag eta!., supra note 51, at 305.
155.
156.
157.
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VII. SUGGESTION TO THE COURTS AND LEGISLATURES
It is apparent that there is a strong need for greater regulation in the
gamete donation industry. 165 There are no federal or state laws
stating whether gamete donations should be open or closed, how
many times a person may donate gametes, how many children can be
conceived from the same donor gametes, or how payment of donors
should be handled. 166 Many laws that are in existence still leave open
the question of legal responsibility of gamete donors for their
conceived biological children. 167 While there are many regulations
that United States courts and legislatures could provide for gamete
donors and purchasers, they should refrain from requiring spousal
consent to donate. 168 Any regulation requiring spousal consent would
surely be found to be unconstitutional, as seen in Danforth. 169
Equally important, it could cause the gamete donation industry to
resort to providing lower quality gametes for its clients. 170
Therefore, instead of depending on courts and legislatures to
provide regulations, the clients of the gamete donation industry
should take it upon themselves to determine whether requiring
spousal consent is important to them. Due to the laissez-faire
economics of the donation industry, fertility clinics would be willing
to provide spousal consent to purchasers who wanted this
characteristic in a donor. 171 If demand were great enough, the gamete
donation industry would surely create a larger supply of this type of
donor for its clients, just as it has created a larger supply of donors
giving more self-identifying information. 172 As it has in the past, the
gamete donation industry will continue to self-regulate in order to
meet the needs of its clients, making it unnecessary for United States
courts and legislatures to intrude on a person's fundamental right to
pnvacy.

VIII. CONCLUSION
As fertility success rates continue to increase, more donorconceived children are being born than ever before. 173 With this is

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part VI.
See supra text accompanying notes 143--48.
See supra Part Vl.C.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
Sauer, supra note 24, at 954.
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the increased possibility that donors and donor-conceived children
will make contact with one another. These new forming relationships
will not only affect the parties involved, but also the families of the
donor and the donor-conceived child. With no present federal or
state law, or even case law, relevant to the issue of spousal consent in
the gamete donation context, family units may become overwhelmed
with the addition of new members and possibly torn apart. However,
the fundamental right to privacy trumps any interest a spouse may
have in gamete donation. Therefore, United States courts and
legislatures should continue to refrain from making decisions for the
gamete donation industry, and allow the industry to regulate itself
and determine on its own when spousal consent is favorable or
necessary.
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